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Northern Ireland Affairs Select Committee: Cross-border co-operation on policing, security and 
criminal justice after Brexit 
 
Written Evidence Submission on behalf of the UK-Irish Criminal Justice Cooperation Network 
 
This submission emanates from an Arts and Humanities Research Council project which funded the 
UK-Irish Criminal Justice Co-operation Network. The network brings together practitioners, academics 
and policy makers from across the regions of the UK and Ireland to explore the impact of Brexit on 
criminal justice co-operation between the UK and Ireland with the aim of understanding the risks and 
possible mitigation of those risks. This written submission reflects the deliberations of over 70 
individuals who have generously given their time to the network over the last two years, as well as 
academic research emanating from the project. 
 
1. What effects Brexit will have on cross-jurisdictional criminality between Northern Ireland 
and the Republic of Ireland 
 
Despite the close working relationship between the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) and An 
Garda Siochána (AGS) ) Brexit presents a risk of increased criminality between Northern Ireland and 
the Republic of Ireland at a time when loss of EU police and judicial co-operation mechanisms will 
negatively impact operational effectiveness.  The extent to which Brexit will impact cross-border 
criminality depends on what the relationship between the EU and the UK looks like after the transition 
period ends.  The more tangible the border and the greater the regulatory divergence between the 
two states the greater the impact will be on crime. The greater the loss of EU co-operation 
mechanisms the harder it will be to deal with transnational crime. There are two distinct ways in 
which a more tangible border could lead to increased levels of criminality. Firstly, this could manifest 
itself in the form of cross-border smuggling of people and/or commodities. Secondly terrorist 
violence could erupt in the wake of a fostering of nationalist sentiment. Risks of increased criminal 
activity could be further compounded by a belief that loss of the EAW and other EU criminal justice 
co-operation mechanisms decreases the risk of detection and/or arrest and that the border could 
be used to avoid/delay prosecution. 
 
 Immigration crime 
 
Divergence of immigration rules between the UK and the EU could create an increased risk of 
organised immigration crime. Whilst there is already some capacity to deal with immigration crime 
and human trafficking this may require further resourcing post Brexit. Currently Operation Gull aims 
to prevent the movement of undocumented migrants crossing the Irish land border and the sea border 
with Britain by conducting periodic document checks at Northern Ireland’s air and seaports. Concerns 
around racial profiling means that this is not as systematic as initially envisaged. Whilst sea ports 
across the south of England are still the most common entry point, in the last few years there has 
already been an increase in the use of Northern Ireland via the Republic as an entry route to the rest 
of the UK. The extent to which Brexit will further increase the use of the Irish border as a route for 
illegal immigration is unclear. EU citizens will still be able to enter the UK for up to 6 months without 
a visa and Ireland is outside of the Schengen Area so it would remain impossible to enter the UK 
without requiring documentation on arrival in Ireland. A close working relationship between border 
control agencies in both countries is needed to minimise the risk of undetected arrival in Ireland which 
would then facilitate entry to the UK through the border. Arrival in Ireland makes it very easy to move 
to the UK through the Common Travel Area, and it is therefore vital that there is investment in 
collaborative border procedures and efficient data sharing. The most important data for immigration 
purposes are fingerprints, DNA and vehicle registration through Prüm and passenger name record 
data via the PNR Directive. It is hoped that the UK will continue to have access to both Prüm and the 
PNR Directive subject to compliance with pre-existing CJEU safeguards. However, although Ireland has 
not implemented SIS II the PSNI regularly use it and are concerned about its loss. The PSNI have 
stressed that they are not a border service and should not be used to check passports or routinely 




Illegal activity attempting to avoid tax differences is not new to the island. Historically between the 
1920s and 1960s smuggling across the border to avoid paying duty on everyday goods was 
widespread. More recently this has remained a feature of the border notwithstanding the customs 
union as there remained differing tax regimes in relation to fuel, cigarettes and alcohol.  Elaborate fuel 
laundering operations which are estimated to have cost the taxpayer £40 million in 2017 alone are an 
example of this sort of activity. Northern Ireland has seen a rise in organised crime in recent years 
which has been linked to ‘paramilitary diversification’. Such organisations are well placed to take 
advantage of different excise duties, VAT regimes and other differences in regulation or standards 
after 01 January 2021. Divergence in environmental protection could also facilitate the smuggling of 




Brexit and the reawakening of the debate over the constitutional status of Northern Ireland 
strengthens the position of the four main politically motivated dissident Irish republican groups and 
fosters nationalist sentiment. Such violence could, as in the past, focus on physical manifestations of 
the border. Any attempt to reinstate border checkpoints would be seen by extremists as a target for 
terrorist attacks. Research has shown that physical infrastructure, even unmanned technology is likely 
to increase tensions.  Dissident Republican terrorists have in the past used the land border to frustrate 
counter-terrorism operations, while they and other organised crime gangs breached bail and crossed 
the land border to avoid prosecution.  Just as the process of European integration was one of the 
catalysts for the depoliticization of Irish/Northern Irish cross-border co-operation the UK’s departure 
from the EU removes this context and reintroduces a political dimension to co-operation. The Irish 
border still holds the potential for conflict. Northern Ireland, for all of its progress, is still a divided 
society and any action which draws attention to the border fuels tension. The current threat level is 
already graded as ‘severe’ by MI5. In recent months Operation Arbacia is an example of a substantial 
co-ordinated operation between the PSNI and the Garda and demonstrates that the terrorism threat 
in Northern Ireland is very real.1 
 
2. What effects Brexit, and the new customs arrangements under the Northern Ireland 
Protocol, could have on criminality between the island of Ireland and Great Britain; 
 
The Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol gives Northern Ireland a unique status. Whilst being officially 
still part of the UK internal market and customs territory, it will be de facto in the EU’s single market 
for goods and operating under the Union Customs Code. This is in order to create a situation in which 
 
1 https://www.irishexaminer.com/news/courtandcrime/arid-40034351.html  
the Irish border remains as open as it currently is. As such, goods circulating in Northern Ireland can 
move across into the EU’s single market without the need for checks or controls. This means that the 
smuggling problem which exists across the Irish border will not radically expand as a UK/EU customs 
frontier, but instead remain one stimulated by the incentive of avoiding VAT and excise duty (e.g. 
cigarettes, fuel) (not insignificant, but not directly undermining of the whole NI legitimate economy) 
The Protocol thus effectively creates a customs and regulatory border down the Irish Sea. The degree 
to which this will cause an incentive for smuggling will depend on three things. First, whether there is 
a UK-EU free trade agreement. If there is such an agreement, with zero tariffs and zero quotas, there 
will be minimum incentive for smuggling across the Irish Sea because there will be no need to try and 
exploit tariff differentials. If there is no FTA, then there will be increased incentive for smuggling across 
the Irish Sea from GB in order to access the EU single market and avoid paying tariffs (as would be 
faced in direct GB to EU movement). This risk will be greatest for those goods which will face the 
highest EU tariffs, e.g. dairy produce.  
In such a no deal scenario, there will also be increased risk of smuggling of goods into GB from the 
Republic of Ireland in order to avoid tariffs on imports to the UK(GB) coming from the EU. This could 
come directly from Ireland (e.g. Dublin-Holyhead), but it would then need to navigate the controls put 
in place for that trade anyway. It could also come via Northern Ireland to exploit the unfettered access 
offered NI-GB. This risk depends greatly on how that NI to GB movement is managed, and on how 
goods qualify as ‘Northern Irish’ for unfettered access. This is still to be determined. 
Secondly, the risk of smuggling depends on the degree to which the UK diverges from EU standards. 
Northern Ireland will continue to follow EU rules when it comes to the production of goods and goods 
will not be allowed into Northern Ireland unless they meet those standards. If the UK remains largely 
aligned in practice to EU standards, then the need for controls will be minimal. The UK Internal Market 
bill means that if one part of Great Britain decides to lower standards, then those goods will not be 
confined to that part of Great Britain but can circulate freely across it. A ‘race to the bottom’ would 
mean that there will be a need for tighter controls on goods entering NI from GB. Foods produced to 
lower standards are cheaper to produce. There will be an incentive to smuggle such goods into 
Northern Ireland where the price differential is significant.  
Third, the risk of smuggling across the Irish Sea is not just about GB or EU goods but those from the 
Rest of the World (ROW). There are differentials between the UK Global Tariff and EU Common 
External Tariff on some 5000 product lines; under the UKGT there will be zero tariffs on 47% of tariff 
lines (compared to on 27% for the CET) and the average tariff will be 5.7% (compared to 7.2% under 
the CET).2 Where the differences are greatest (e.g. in processed agricultural produce), then the 
incentive for the ROW to import into GB and then access the EU via NI will be the highest. It is for this 
reason that the EU Commission proposed that tariff differentials form the basis for the definition of 
goods as being “at risk” of being smuggled into NI from GB (and thus be subject to tariff payment in 
advance).3 This issue will remain live as the UK secures new FTAs around the world.  
All in all, the risk of smuggling across the Irish Sea is lower than that of smuggling across the Irish 
border given the fact that the added logistical difficulties and the costs of movement across that 
border substantially effects the profitability of such smuggling. It is also more simple to effectively 
manage and control entry and exit of goods from specified air and sea ports rather than across a 
500km land border of some 280 crossings. This is no doubt part of the reason for the Protocol in the 
first place: practicality.  
However, it should be recognised that there is some doubt about the implementation of the 
Ireland/Northern Ireland Protocol. Legal uncertainty about the implementation of the Protocol 
would mean that the international economic status of Northern Ireland – and goods produced in 
and exported from there – will become immediately insecure. This would be compounded by the 
absence of a UK-EU deal. The rules that apply to goods produced in and moving to/from Northern 
Ireland need to be absolutely clear in order to create the conditions for legal business and trade. 
More broadly, it looks extremely unlikely that the UK authorities will be ready to implement the 
Protocol effectively from 1 January 2021. The EU will be keen to assess as to the scale and immediacy 
of the subsequent risk for smuggling/criminality exploiting a poorly enforced sea border. Such a risk 
would be all the greater without a UK-EU deal, for reasons explained above.  
 
3. What new barriers will be created to cross-border security co-operation between the UK 
and the Republic of Ireland when the transition period ends, including if no deal on the UK-
EU future relationship is agreed 
 
Despite the positive number of bi-lateral police co-operation arrangements between the AGS and 
PSNI, EU processes and institutions still facilitate much of the cooperation between the PSNI and the 





and criminality.  Between the UK and Ireland a huge amount of data is exchanged. This was estimated 
by network members to be between 60-70K items of shared information a year.  In a no deal scenario 
the primary areas of concern are the loss of the EAW (dealt with below) and ECRIS. A quick and 
reliable method of assessing criminal records is needed when policing across an open border. The 
proposed EU treaty offers some improvement to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in 
Criminal Matters 1959. The treaty proposes communication of criminal record information on each 
other’s nationals once a month rather than once a year. The treaty provides for electronic exchange 
but the technical details of this are not yet published. Whilst ACRO are making preparations for the 
loss of ECRIS any replacement will inevitably be much slower and less reliable.  
In a no deal scenario the loss of the Prüm database would similarly present obstacles to checking 
identity through fingerprints and DNA. The loss of access to SIS II is less problematic for cross-border 
co-operation as Ireland does not yet have access to the database (although it plans to link up 
imminently). From a UK perspective the PSNI use SIS II to run checks at ports in Northern Ireland. The 
loss of SIS II with the UK is not considered a particular threat to Ireland as the size of the population 
means that conventional methods of information exchange are still effective. Whilst Europol and 
Eurojust are important to the UK, if an investigation only involved the UK and Ireland, these 
institutions would not be used. 
One important aspect of Brexit is that it takes away much of the legal architecture which informal 
cooperation has flourished under. Cross-border cooperation between the ROI and the UK is anchored 
by the Intergovernmental Agreement on Co-operation on Criminal Justice Matters (July 2005 and April 
2010), which provides a structured framework to enhance and develop more effective North-South 
cooperation and coordination and includes a programme of secondment between the two police 
forces. In 2010 and again in 2016 the PSNI and AGS launched a Joint Cross-border Policing Strategy, 
which aims to disrupt criminal activity across the border. At operational level the Joint Manual of 
Guidance aims to support police and prosecution services across both jurisdictions dealing with 
investigations that have a cross-border element. In November 2015, the UK and ROI governments and 
the Northern Ireland Executive agreed to the creation of a Joint Agency Task Force as part of a 
concerted and enhanced effort to tackle organised and cross-jurisdictional crime led by senior officers 
from the PSNI, AGS, the Revenue Commissioners and HM Revenue and Customs.  This agency will 
become increasingly important after Brexit. Devolution has marked an era of enhanced capacity for 
co-ordination in this area and one of the priority areas for discussion in the North/South Ministerial 
Council (on the island of Ireland) has consistently been that of justice. Brexit does not remove these 
informal co-operation mechanisms and co-operation between the PSNI and AGS has never been 
better. However, removal of the UK from police cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters means that the legal architecture supporting informal co-operation is removed. Data 
protection concerns in the event of a no deal or in the absence of an adequacy decision will alarm 
practitioners who will fear sharing information if they are unsure of the legal basis for doing so. There 
will be new processes in place which many police officers and lawyers will have to familiarise 
themselves with and legal challenges are likely to become more frequent. Goodwill and a desire to co-
operate on both sides of the border does not extend to breaking the law. Information will not be 
shared if there is no legal basis to do so. There is a real danger that the loss of EU level agreements 
will lead to a slow grinding down of co-operation as we move forward. It is suggested that bilateral 
co-operation can mitigate this risk as discussed. 
 
4. What steps need to be taken by the UK Government, in collaboration with the Irish 
Government, to replace any loss of access to the European Arrest Warrant as a tool for law 
enforcement co-operation between the UK and the Republic of Ireland in the context of: 
 
(a) a future relationship deal agreed between the UK and EU that includes arrangements 
for security and judicial co-operation; 
 
Access to the EAW or a EAW style system has always been a top priority for UK and Irish criminal 
justice organisations. Ireland’s Department of Justice and Equality 2017 Annual Report on the 
operation of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 stated ‘[t]he departure of the UK is particularly 
significant for Ireland on a range of issues. However, in the context of combatting crime and terrorism, 
the necessity to maintain a functioning system of extradition between the two States has been 
identified as the key priority’.4 The shared land border and geographic proximity, the free movement 
of persons under the Common Travel Area and the history of politically-related violence between and 
within Great Britain and the island of Ireland all contribute to the priority. The benefits of the EAW 
have been well set out during the opt out and in decision of 2014 and throughout the Brexit process. 
Ireland is the UK’s largest ‘trading partner’ for EAWs. From September 2018 to August 2019 the PSNI 
issued 38 EAWs, twenty-six of which related to the Republic of Ireland and 12 to all other EU states.  
Conversely, the PSNI received 5 requests from the Republic of Ireland during that period, out of a total 
of 44 EAWs.  The EAW has strengthened mutual trust between Ireland and the UK in extradition 
 
4 Department of Justice and Equality, Report on the operation of the European Arrest Warrant Act 2003 (as 
amended) for the year 2017, p 4, cited at 
http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/European_Arrest_Warrant_Annual_Report_for_2017.pdf/Files/European_Arre
st_Warrant_Annual_Report_for_2017.pdf <accessed 29-08-20>.  
matters. Having its origins in Irish case law, extradition between Ireland and Northern Ireland broke 
down within a decade of the founding of the Irish Republic. From 1928 to 1965 there were no 
practically applicable arrangements between the two. Things changed as both the UK and Ireland 
participated in international agreements and over the last 17 years the EAW has further smoothed 
the extradition waters as both re-embraced the principle of mutual trust and recognition.  
The preferable replacement to the EAW is an EU-UK multilateral treaty. This is simply because the 
UK’s extradition relations would be the same with all its former partners. However, the priority is a 
functioning system of extradition whether that be multilateral or bilateral. Both the UK and the EU 
have set out proposals which closely mirror the Norway/Iceland agreement and would in most ways 
provide an adequate replacement for the EAW. It is proposed under the EU agreement that Member 
States may declare derogations to certain aspects of the Treaty. These include derogations on the 
refusal to extradite on the grounds that the offence is political and extradition of nationals or a 
requirement that nationals be transferred back to their home state to serve their sentence. It is not 
anticipated that Ireland would make either of these derogations.  Ireland have recently made 
legislative provision to ensure Irish nationals can be extradited to the UK under the 1957 Convention 
post-Brexit and they have not made any of these declarations in relation to the Iceland/Norway 
agreement. However, recent CJEU case law makes it clear that Ireland (as a Member State) would be 
obliged to inform the country of nationality of a Union citizen when applying a third party extradition 
agreement and to give priority to any EAW. When the UK becomes a ‘third country’ for the purposes 
of extradition with EU countries after 31 December 2020 its requests for extradition will be secondary 
to any request from the country of nationality for all EU citizens. If the UK requests extradition of a 
Polish citizen from Ireland, for example, Ireland will first contact Poland to make them aware of the 
request and will give precedence to a Polish EAW.  
The EU’s negotiating mandate unambiguously sets out legal parameters for post-Brexit co-operation 
as continued UK ECHR compliance which includes the ability of individuals to enforce Convention 
rights directly in UK courts.  Confidence in whether human rights will continue to be embedded in 
the legal systems of the UK has been undermined by the UK Government’s recent statements on 
the Human Rights Act 1998. Whilst it is recognised that this stumbling block could prevent an EU-
UK agreement being reached it needs to be recognised that it could also act as a stumbling block to 
bilateral co-operation, even with Ireland. 
In the absence of an EU-UK agreement extradition to and from Ireland will continue under the 1957 
Convention. However, such extradition will be without the benefit of associated defence rights and 
access to other aspects of the EU acquis such as prisoner transfer. Despite political will to co-operate, 
such omissions alone could give rise to legal challenge in Irish courts or before the CJEU on the 
weakness of human rights protection.  Whilst the UK Government will not accept being bound directly 
by CJEU decisions indirectly the UK will be impacted by the court as the CJEU has jurisdiction over third 
party extradition agreements from the Member State perspective. The UK Government must be 
prepared to offer credible guarantees about future formal and institutional human rights 
compliance. Fundamental rights lie at the heart of the EU project and are inescapably linked to the 
ECHR’s scheme of protection.  Human rights standards distilled from the ECHR, influence each 
Member States’ internal legal orders. This is particularly true in Ireland. The ECHR is therefore a 
valuable bridge in shoring up fundamental rights commitments in the arrangements that will define 
the UK’s future relationship with the EU and with Member States such as Ireland.  
 
What steps need to be taken by the UK Government, in collaboration with the Irish Government, to 
replace any loss of access to the European Arrest Warrant as a tool for law enforcement co-
operation between the UK and the Republic of Ireland in the context of: 
(b) there being no deal agreed between the UK and EU before the transition period ends on 
31 December 2020; 
 
If an agreement between the EU and UK is not concluded and ratified by 31 December 2020 the UK 
and Ireland will have to fall back on the 1957 European Convention on Extradition, in the medium 
term at least. The problems with the Convention are well rehearsed.  Reliance on the 1957 Convention 
could see a slow grinding of co-operation, previously lubricated by membership of the EU. If sectarian 
violence were to resurface theoretically requests for extradition under the 1957 Convention of any 
individuals wanted on IRA related terrorism charges, could be refused on the basis of Article 3 of the 
1957 Convention, which prohibits extradition for offences ‘regarded by the requested Party as a 
political offence or as an offence connected with a political offence.’ Of course, both Ireland and the 
UK remain party to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism 1977, which stands in 
the way of reliance on the exception. There is no doubt, however, EU membership and the Framework 
Decision on the EAW, acted to build the trust to render the revival of the exception, unthinkable. The 
proposed UK-EU agreement, in line with the Norway-Iceland agreement, bars refusal of co-operation 
on the grounds that the offence may be regarded by the executing state as a political offence, 
connected with a political offence or inspired by political motives.  Whilst the proposed UK-EU 
agreement would protect the UK and Ireland from problems that could arise in relation to sectarian 
terrorism charges, the 1957 Convention per se does not. 
 
Both countries have made legislative preparations to facilitate falling back on the 1957 Convention 
and we heard that Irish prosecutors had for some time been working to identify backlogs in EAW 
caseloads to lessen problems arising with EAWs that had been issued but not executed before 31 
December 2020. Article 62 of the Withdrawal Agreement provides that EAWs executed before the 
end of the transition period continue to operate under the Framework Decision.5 This would seem to 
provide that provisional arrest warrants will not be required in the UK if the EAW has already been 
executed before the end of the year. If this is the case Ireland will be able to reciprocate. The UK and 
Irish governments should work together to ensure the operation of Article 62 is clear and 
consideration should be given to the role that CJEU case law will have once the transition period 
ends in terms of EAWs executed in the UK before 31 December 2020. 
 
5. What steps the UK can take to replace any loss of access to existing EU data and information-
sharing arrangements 
 
The draft EU treaty makes provision for access to the Prüm framework facilitating automatic searching 
and comparison of DNA profiles, fingerprints and vehicle registration data as well as passenger records 
through the PNR Directive. However, there is a loss of capability in all other areas. There is no access 
to SIS II for real time data although there will be ‘cooperation on operational information’. Data would 
be provided only in response to a request and would therefore not be comparable to SIS II. The draft 
treaty does not envisage access to ECRIS. The UK will have to fall back on the 1959 European 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters which would be supplemented by setting out 
the detail for making requests for assistance and agreeing a timeframe for responding to requests. 
Once conviction information has been requested there is provision for an automated electronic 
system for exchanging information although the technical details have yet to be set out. The primary 
problem with these arrangements is the significant increase in time it takes to obtain the relevant 
 
5 Article 62(1)(b) - Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA(3) shall apply in respect of European arrest 
warrants where the requested person was arrested before the end of the transition period for the purposes of 
the execution of a European arrest warrant, irrespective of the decision of the executing judicial authority as to 
whether the requested person is to remain in detention or be provisionally released. 
criminal conviction information for Foreign National Offenders and how out of date information might 
be. There is no provision for asset freezing and confiscation or prisoner transfer. 
 
A bilateral agreement which covers areas of co-operation such as prisoner transfer, supervision of 
probation and recognition of financial penalties could help to facilitate free movement across the 
border. A bilateral agreement covering exchange of criminal records and mutual legal assistance 
would also be particularly desirable. The legal basis for a bilateral agreement is considered in question 
7 but in short this is much easier in areas where the EU has chosen not to enter into an agreement 
and therefore has no competence.  
 
6. How Brexit will affect co-operation between the PSNI and AGS, as well as UK and Irish crime 
agencies, in tackling cross-border crime;  
 
Cooperation between UK and Ireland in policing and criminal matters has long predated membership 
of the EU and much cooperation between the two countries is outside of the EU framework.  The PSNI 
have a central academy for Brexit which is attempting to maximise existing structures and is making 
sure what currently exists works well, such as the cross-border agency taskforce. The PSNI had funding 
for an additional 300 officers. Much of this resource has gone to the borders but also into local 
communities and Belfast. There is evidence of increased community tensions in the build up to Brexit 
therefore, resources need to be spent on building trust and legitimacy. A recent example is Operation 
Arbacia which has worked to prevent planned attacks on police and prison officers in Northern Ireland 
in the run-up to the conclusion of the Brexit talks.  Scotland have increased their border policing unit 
by 60 and this will increase further as they move forward. The new officers are primarily uniformed 
officers and counter terrorist officers liaising with the Home Office border force and mirror the 
percentage increase in Home Office numbers.  From the Irish perspective AGS have focused its Brexit 
preparations on examining existing structures and ensuring they work. The critical areas for AGS are 
the EAW and data sharing. Ireland will after Brexit have an international land border but policing will 
primarily remain the same and their focus is on ensuring the quality of life of all individuals who reside 
within the area of the border and they are keen to ensure that policing of the border is as informal as 
possible. AGS have been building on their already very good levels of co-operation with the PSNI with 
a further focus on ratcheting up cross-border co-operation looking for areas to enhance co-operation. 
In particular AGS have encouraged better relations at a district level between those working in the 
border area.  
 
Brexit has therefore not only created risks but also opportunities. It has increased the conversations 
about the international world, highlighted differences in legislation and approaches in the regions 
and overall relationships between the regions has improved as a result. This has happened through 
the Brexit cross law enforcement group which is co-chaired by the NCA and NPCC. Overall, there is 
more communication now between different agencies and relations between AGS and PSNI are better 
than they have ever been. However, there are external constraints. High level political rhetoric does 
not always transform into real forums where agencies can really work on the issues that Brexit 
presents. No one can remove the fact that the border is deeply politically sensitive. It is difficult to 
discuss the border at all levels and this is frustrating. Warm words about ensuring the peace process 
is not damaged must be backed by practical realities as confidence in border communities is dripping 
away. There needs to be clear evidence that the UK Government understands the difficulties Brexit 
poses for policing of the border. 
 
The feeling of network members was that focus should not just be on maintaining cross-border 
relationships but on enhancing them. Many felt that this could only be achieved by the creation of 
a permanently established joint operational centre involving key personnel from the police services 
of each of the devolved nations and AGS. This could operate on a model seen between multi-agency 
hubs for UK joint intelligence and operations but on a cross-border level. Such co-operation needs to 
have a legal basis. An example of highly functional police co-operation can be seen between the Nordic 
countries. Co-operation is based on formally signed international law instruments supplemented with 
intergovernmental protocols. Enhanced co-operation is premised on a shared history (not always 
harmonious), a common legal and policing culture and the removal of passport controls long before 
the advent of Schengen.  Co-operation is driven by the Nordic Council which is the official body for 
inter-parliamentary co-operation. Adherence to the rule of law and human rights principles underpin 
co-operation.  The network also heard evidence of a model of co-operation between police in the 
South of England and France which, from a legal perspective is ahead of what is available between 
north and south of Ireland. The UK-France Coordination and Information Centre underpins co-
operation between the UK and France. The centre’s legal basis comes from the Sandhurst Treaty.6 The 
 
6 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/joint-uk-france-centre-opens-in-calais-to-tackle-criminality-at-border  
UK should investigate with Ireland the appetite for agreeing a similar treaty and coordination centre 
with its own budget as they have done with France and is modelled by the Nordic countries. 
 
Post Brexit the landscape will not be the same. The instruments that have been utilised to great effect 
over the last 20 years will not all be available. We will therefore have to find alternative ways of 
ensuring that co-operation between the two countries continues to flourish. Culturally, economically 
and politically these islands have been inextricably linked for centuries and Brexit should not alter this.   
The UK government should not underestimate how quickly informal co-operation can deteriorate if 
crime, even low impact crime, increases across the border.  With the advent of GDPR and the Law 
Enforcement Directive informal cooperation is likely to be less effective than it has been in the past. 
Formalising co-operation through legal instrument and establishing a joint operational centre offers a 
positive way forward. This is more likely to be successful if supplemented by high level forums for co-
operation. What the UK negotiates with the EU about criminal justice co-operation both now and in 
the future uniquely impacts Northern Ireland. It is recommended that the remit of the British-Irish 
Council be expanded to include criminal justice co-operation. This would emulate the Nordic model 
which sees criminal justice co-operation driven by justice ministers in the Nordic Council.7 
 
7. What scope exists for the UK and the Republic of Ireland to pursue alternative approaches 
to policing, security and criminal justice co-operation outside the EU acquis. 
 
The preferable replacement to the EAW is an EU-UK multilateral treaty. However, a bilateral 
agreement would form a bridge between the EAW and any subsequent multilateral agreement and 
would mitigate the failings of the 1957 Convention. Article 4 of the Council Decision implementing the 
Withdrawal Agreement (2020/135) states that Ireland can request permission to negotiate bilateral 
agreements with the United Kingdom in areas of exclusive competence of the Union. Such a request 
needs to show that the agreement is necessary for the proper functioning of the arrangements set 
out in the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland and the envisaged agreement is compatible with 
Union law and does not put at risk the attainment of an objective of the Union’s external action in the 
area concerned. The Council must consent to the final text of the agreement.8  Bilateral negotiations 
 
7 https://www.norden.org/en/news/call-closer-police-co-operation  
8 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?toc=OJ%3AL%3A2020%3A029%3ATOC&uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2020.029.01.0001.01.ENG  
between the UK and Ireland should begin as soon as possible and should not wait until 01 January 
2021. If Ireland and the UK were to successfully conclude a bilateral agreement this could be 
influential in any later EU-UK agreement. Given the legal and linguistic connections between the two 
countries it is hard to see a larger agreement being made without the former being successful. Current 
stumbling blocks to a multi-lateral agreement such as a proportionality bar would be easier to 
overcome in a bilateral agreement. 
The Nordic countries have had a regional system of extradition, akin to the backing of warrants system 
which predated the EAW. Like the UK and Ireland the Nordic countries had an area of free movement 
of people which predated Schengen and co-operation was underpinned by mutual trust and 
historically strong cultural, legal and linguistic ties between the countries. In 2005 parties agreed the 
Nordic Arrest Warrant (NAW). This was inspired by the EAW and mirrors its substantive provisions. 
However, the NAW goes even further than the EAW with lower minimum penalties, complete 
abolition of double criminality, no territoriality restrictions and limits on the speciality rule. The time 
limits are even shorter than those found in the EAW and it is described as ‘an even more efficient 
extradition procedure between close neighbours.’9 It is therefore wholly possible for Ireland and the 
UK to conclude a bilateral extradition agreement with terms even closer than those found in the 
EAW. 
The principle of EU citizenship has always been at the heart of the EAW.  Whilst Brexit changes the 
status of UK citizens, who no longer enjoy EU citizenship, it does not change the fundamental tenets 
of the Good Friday agreement. Citizens of Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland are to be 
treated equally, they can choose Irish citizenship, British citizenship or both. They are free to choose 
where to live, work and study.  The shared history of the UK and Ireland, particularly in relation to 
their citizens living on the island of Ireland, lends strong justification to a continued close extradition 
relationship. The NAW offers a blueprint for a future which could see the UK and Ireland enjoy closer 
extradition arrangements than at present without harming or hindering the EAW or the prospects 
of a UK-EU multilateral agreement.  
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